The Killing of Osama Bin Laden by Sopko, Alexander J
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2013
The Killing of Osama Bin Laden
Alexander J. Sopko
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Sopko, Alexander J., "The Killing of Osama Bin Laden" (2013). Law School Student Scholarship. 308.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/308
Introduction: 
 
 The targeted killing Osama Bin Laden was legal under both international law and U.S. 
domestic law.  Under Article 2 Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, President Barack Obama is the 
commander-in-chief of the military and he had the statutory authorization to order and execute 
the mission under the Authorization to Use Military Force Act of September 18
th
.
1
  The 
operation was neither an extrajudicial killing that lacked due process nor a violation of Pakistan’s 
sovereignty under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.  It was a permissible use of force as an act of 
national self-defense because Bin Laden continued to pose a serious an imminent threat to the 
United States.
2
  When the Navy SEALs shot and killed Bin Laden they did not violate the laws 
of war.  Bin Laden, by virtue of his position as the head of Al-Qaeda, was considered an enemy 
combatant, and under the rules of engagement, if the SEALs reasonably believed that he posed 
an immediate threat, they had the absolute authority to kill him.
3
  
 On May 2, 2011 U.S. Navy SEALs Team, SEAL Team Six, infiltrated Osama Bin 
Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and killed the al Qaeda leader.  The issue is whether 
the killing of Bin Laden was legal under international law as well as U.S. domestic law.  The 
Obama Administration said yes, absolutely; however, experts are unsure.  Days following the 
raid Attorney General Eric Holder told members of the Senate Judiciary Committee that it was 
lawful “as an act of self-defense.”4  Holder stated, “Bin Laden was the head of al Qaeda, an 
organization that had conducted the attacks of September 11
th
.  It is lawful to target an enemy 
commander in the field.”5 
                                                        
1
 The Authorization to Use Military Force Act of September 18, 2001. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. Retrieved December 2, 2012. 
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 Bin Laden had been on the radar of the United States since the early 90’s.  As the leader 
of al Qaeda, a highly organized terrorist network throughout the world, Presidents Bill Clinton, 
George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all had issued orders to kill or capture him.  For purposes 
of this paper, the killing of Bin Laden will be classified as a targeted killing by the United States.  
As such, certain legal implications come into play and will be addressed throughout.  
 The first barrier that must be overcome in determining the legality of Bin Laden’s killing 
is a domestic one.  His killing is contingent upon whether the U.S. officials who ordered the raid 
had the necessary statutory authorization to do so.  Domestic statutory authorization is a pre-
requisite for any militaristic act ordered by the executive branch. 
 The second issue regards the legality of targeted killings and, more specifically, how 
individuals are lawfully targeted.  There is much scholarly debate as to whether targeted killings 
violate international law.  This paper will examine the various aspects of a targeted killing from 
both ends of the spectrum.  Another sub-issue that presents itself here is whether the act of 
targeting and killing an individual in a foreign state adheres to international human rights law or 
international humanitarian law (i.e., jus in bello).
6
  Both bodies of law are meant to control 
government conduct in the international community.  Whereas the former is meant to regulate 
government conduct at all times, the latter, jus in bello, covers government conduct during 
wartime.
7
 
 The third issue is whether the incursion of U.S. forces into Pakistani territory without the 
clear consent of Islamabad violates Pakistan’s sovereignty.  And whether this use of force in 
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violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty is in contravention to the UN Charter.8  At stake is whether 
Pakistan had consented, and whether the U.S. was lawfully acting in self-defense.
9
  
 The fourth issue that will be addressed is a factual one and it hinges on whether any of 
the actions taken by the Navy Seals during the raid were in violation of the rules of war and U.S. 
domestic law.  U.S. law is seemingly irrelevant as to whether it was legal under international law 
for the U.S. to invade Pakistan’s sovereignty.  However, in the context of a targeted killing, it 
must be addressed.  The Navy SEALs team’s actions in regard to what they encountered on the 
night of the raid are critical in determining whether they adhered to the rules of war and U.S. 
domestic law.    
 Finally, interwoven throughout this paper are issues dealing with accountability and 
transparency.  International law requires that States maintain some sense of transparency and are 
accountable for their actions.
10
  Accordingly, a State must investigate war crime allegations and 
prosecute when appropriate.  This area of international law is even more intensified when there is 
an alleged violation of the procedures banning extrajudicial executions.
11
  The paper will not 
dedicate an entire section to accountability and transparency; however, the reader should be 
aware of both aspects of international law throughout.  
I. President Barack Obama and the U.S officials who ordered the raid had domestic 
statutory authorization.  
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 Under the guise of President Barack Obama, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
orchestrated the operation, code-named Operation Neptune Spear.
12
  Covert members of a Navy 
Special Forces Division, better known as Seal Team Six, launched the operation from 
neighboring Afghanistan and infiltrated the compound in Pakistan.
13
  Other units included the 
U.S. Army’s Special Operations Command’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and 
other CIA operatives.
14
  Accordingly, one can conclude that U.S. officials not only ordered the 
mission, but various branches of the U.S. military and special intelligence agencies solely carried 
it out.  Therefore, one must then ask whether those U.S. officials and military branches had the 
statutory authorization to carry out the operation.   
a. U.S. Presidential Executive Order 12333.  
 On December 4, 1981 U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed into effect Executive Order 
12333.
15
  The intent of the Order was to expand certain powers and responsibilities of U.S. 
Intelligence Agencies and compel those Agency heads to comply with CIA requests for 
information.
16
   
 One relevant section of the Order is applicable to our analysis here.  Section 2.11 
reiterated, from prior Executive Orders, the proscription on U.S. Intelligence Agencies 
sponsoring or carrying out an assassination.
17
  Section 2.11 reads, “No person employed by or 
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, 
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assassination, effectively retiring the last sanctioned assassin of the CIA, code named 
‘Meroving’.”18   
 Executive Order 12333, on its face, is seemingly a bar to assassinations and, one might 
presume, targeted killings.  However, if we interpret the killing of Bin Laden as a military action 
in the ongoing U.S. armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, Executive Order 12333 would not apply 
because it does not prohibit the killing of specific leaders of an opposing force.
19
  Further, as 
early as 1998, the proscription against assassination was reinterpreted, and relaxed, for targets 
whom the U.S. classified as individuals connected to terrorism.
20
 
 The assassination prohibition of Executive Order 12333 also does not apply because, as 
Gary Solis (Georgetown Law Professor and former Marine) puts it, there is a strong difference 
between an assassination and a targeted killing.
21
  This article will analyze the exact components 
of a targeted killing infra, but for now it will just address the difference between a targeted 
killing and an assassination.  For Solis, a targeted killing is not an assassination if certain 
conditional requirements are met: (i) there is an ongoing military conflict, (ii) the targeted 
individual (civilian or military) has taken up arms, (iii) there is no reasonable possibility of 
arrest, and (iv) the decision to kill is made by senior political figures.
22
  All four aforementioned 
components are clearly met in the present case.   
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 The anti-assassination provision of Executive Order 12333 also does not apply to killings 
in self-defense.
23
  The current Administration can argue that Obama’s orders to kill Bin Laden 
were permissible under international law as an acceptable action in self-defense because Bin 
Laden was conspiring to commit additional attacks against the U.S.
24
 Abraham Sofaer (Former 
Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department) has been quoted saying, “Killings in self-defense 
are not more ‘assassinations’ in international affairs than they are murders when undertaken by 
our police forces against domestic killers.”25 
 In summation, although Executive Order 12333 proscribes assassination, its 
interpretation is limited in scope and does not prohibit the targeted killing of known terrorists 
such as Bin Laden.  This is because: (i) branches of the U.S. military are authorized to target the 
leaders of an opposing force such as Al-Qaeda, (ii) an assassination and a targeted killing are 
fundamentally different in theory and in practice, and (iii) the U.S., acting in self-defense, may 
target an individual it deems a threat to national security.   
b. The Authorization to Use Military Force Act.  
 In the wake of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush passed the Authorization 
to Use Military Force Act (AUMF).
26
  The AUMF empowers the President of the United States 
to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against persons who authorized, planned, or 
committed the September 11
th
 attacks, or who harbored said persons or groups.
27
  The AUMF is 
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a joint resolution, which was passed by the U.S. Congress on September 14, 2001 and signed 
President Bush on September 18
th
.  Section 2(a) states,  
“IN GENERAL – That the President is authorized to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons.”28 
 
   Under the AUMF Congress granted the President the power to unilaterally target certain 
individuals connected to the September 11
th
 attacks.  Congress also stated that the “grave acts of 
violence” committed on the United States continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat 
to “[its] national security and foreign policy.”29   
 The passage of the AUMF also served another purpose: to broaden the scope of 
presidential power.  Then Vice President Cheney and White House Chief of Staff David 
Addington convinced Congress to broaden the definition of the AUMF.
30
   As a result, Congress 
could not place any limits on: (i) the President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, (ii) the 
amount of military force used in response to that threat, or (iii) method, timing, and nature of the 
response.
31
  
 The AUMF clearly provided President Barack Obama the capacity to use all necessary 
force when he executed the orders to raid Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan.  This Act is the 
first of many legislative devices that gave President Obama the domestic ability to use military 
force against members of Al-Qaeda on the international level. 
c. Constitutional Powers.  
                                                        
28
 Section 2(a). The Authorization to Use Military Force Act of September 18, 2001. 
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 As stated supra, the U.S. has claimed that the killing of Bin Laden was an act of self-
defense.  Bin Laden posed an ongoing and continuous threat to U.S. national security.  Article 2, 
Section 2 of the Constitution grants the President the exclusive authority to order the killing of a 
targeted individual enemy of the U.S. in self-defense.
32
   
 Under Article 2, Section 2 the President is the commander-in-chief of the military, and, 
since the Clinton Administration, lawyers of the executive branch have contended that, under 
this clause, the President has the implicit authority to use lethal force when necessary.
33
  
Historian Thomas Woods states, “[this section] has been interpreted to mean that the President 
may act with an essentially free hand in foreign affairs, or at the very least that he may send men 
into battle without consulting Congress.”34  
 Therefore, it is clear that President Obama had the domestic statutory ability to order, 
plan, and execute the raid.  This is because Executive Order 12333 is not a bar to targeted 
killings, the AUMF is an Act of Congress that grants the President the exclusive ability to 
execute such an order, and Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution can be interpreted as an 
implicit grant of Presidential power to unilaterally use military force in this fashion without the 
consent of Congress.  The next section of this paper will define and analyze the various 
components of a targeted killing, and address whether a targeted killing is legal under 
international law.   
II. Targeted Killings.  
                                                        
32
 Gellman, Barton (October 28, 2001). “CIA Weighs ‘Targeted Killing’ Missions.” Washingtonpost.com. Retrieved 
November 13, 2012.  
33
 Gellman, Barton (October 28, 2001). “CIA Weighs ‘Targeted Killing’ Missions.” Washingtonpost.com. Retrieved 
November 13, 2012. 
34
 Gellman, Barton (October 28, 2001). “CIA Weighs ‘Targeted Killing’ Missions.” Washingtonpost.com. Retrieved 
November 13, 2012. 
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 A targeted killing is classified as the intentional killing of a targeted person, by a 
government or its agents.
35
  The targeted individual is considered to be an unlawful enemy 
belligerent by the targeting government, and is typically not in their custody.
36
  Further, the 
targeted individual has allegedly lost certain immunities provided by the Third Geneva 
Conventions that would otherwise be applicable because the target has been engaging in 
terrorism or armed conflict, through the use of bearing arms or otherwise.
37
 
 The governmental tactic of targeting certain individuals raises difficult questions 
pertaining to: (i) what type of conditions must exist before the tactic can be employed, (ii) who 
may qualify as an appropriate “kill list” target, and (iii) what are the legal implications for its 
application.
38
  Some experts consider a targeted killing to be a legal form of self-defense that 
reduces terrorism
39
, and others, on the opposite end of the spectrum, classify it as an extrajudicial 
killing that lacks due process.
40
   
 Unfortunately, there is no law or bright line rule on targeted killings.  Therefore, all this 
article can provide are both sides of the argument: one advocating and justifying it as a necessary 
result of the new enemy the U.S. is facing, and one vehemently opposing it as being morally 
repugnant and lacking certain wartime procedural safeguards.      
a. The current program on targeted killing does have its benefits; it is an 
effective and precise way to take out an enemy belligerent without incurring 
substantial loss of civilian life. 
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 The United States’ military tactic of issuing and implementing targeting killings dates 
back to World War II, during FDR’s administration.  After U.S. planes had shot down Admiral 
Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect behind the attacks on Pearl Harbor, over the Pacific, FDR 
remarked that he would continue to endorse this new policy of targeting certain individuals 
whom the U.S. deemed an ongoing threat to national security.
41
  
 John Yoo (Professor at Berkeley Law) advocates targeted killings claiming that precise 
attacks against individual enemy terrorists are based on precedent and they “further the goals of 
the laws of war by eliminating the enemy and reducing harm to innocent civilians.”42  He further 
explains that the rational behind a targeted killing is that, in today’s undefined war with limitless 
battlefields, attacking a specific individual rather than a larger military installment limits 
collateral damage.
43
  Targeted killings are proportional and necessary to the threat they 
represent.
44
   
 Today’s war with Al-Qaeda is unprecedented in the sense that it is complicated by the 
fact that “America’s enemy resembles a network not a nation.”45  Al-Qaeda’s leaders, members, 
commanders, and fighters are classified as enemy belligerents because they do not wear 
customary distinguishing uniforms; they conceal themselves within civilian populations; and 
their command and control apparatus is far from being evident and transparent.
46
  Because Al-
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Qaeda is not a traditional enemy, the United States’ technological process of targeting certain 
individuals and then taking them out is a last resort and a potent one at that.
47
  The military 
process of Targeting and killing members of Al-Qaeda serves the dual purpose demoralizing and 
creating confusion amongst the enemy.
48
   
 Unlike conventional warfare means and methods, today’s war with Al-Qaeda is against a 
dispersed enemy with undefined borders and no territory to invade.
49
  The United States’ 
continued success in the “war on terror” hinges on its ability to destroy Al-Qaeda by selectively 
killing or capturing its members.
50
  Although critics claim that targeted killings are unjustified as 
morally irresponsible and lacking due process, unfortunately they are a necessary result of the 
new kind of enemy the U.S. is facing.   
 Targeted killings are further justified when the country involved consents or is unwilling 
or unable to take action against the threat.
51
  This particular aspect of a targeted killing will be 
addressed supra, in the section on Pakistani Sovereignty.  The key issue that will be addressed 
there is whether Pakistan consented to the raid on Bin Laden’s compound or whether they were 
unable to take action, had they known he was taking refuge in Pakistan.  For now, the next 
section of this paper will examine some of the legal and moral implications of the U.S. policy on 
targeted killings.  
b. There are glaring weaknesses in the current administration’s policy on 
targeted killings.  
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 The first part of this section will look at the Obama Administration and analyze their 
views on targeted killings.  Some of the things that the Obama Administration has done since 
implementing a targeted killing policy underscore the fact that they are unsure whether such a 
practice is legal under international law.   
 John O. Brennan (Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism) has justified the Administration’s policy on targeted killings from an 
international law and domestic law standpoint.  As a matter of domestic law, the Constitution 
and the AUMF empowers the President to protect the nation and use all necessary force against 
the possible threat of an attack that he deems is imminent.
52
  And, as a matter of international 
law, since the United States is at war with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, it may use force consistent 
with its inherent right to national self-defense as a result of September 11
th
 attacks.
53
  This type 
of rhetoric clearly carries argumentative weight, but the current Administration is saying one 
thing and doing the exact opposite.  For example, it appears that it is insulating itself from certain 
liabilities if they were to arise in the future as a direct result of the current policy on targeted 
killings. 
 The Obama Administration has made a certain departure from the traditional processes of 
targeted killings carried out by prior administrations.  In 2011 the method for selecting targets 
outside of defined boarders and warzones was amended so that power was condensed to a small 
group of people within the White House.
54
  Under this new plan, White House Counter Terror 
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Chief John Brennan compiles a list of potential targets and goes over the names with other 
agencies at a weekly White House meeting.
55
  At the head of this top-secret operation that 
designates terrorists for kill or capture is President Obama.
56
  He has the final authority to 
approve or disapprove any lethal action, and he further signs off on any strike in Pakistan, 
Somalia, or Yemen.
57
   
 The targeted killing program has also intensified under the Obama Administration.  
Unlike the Bush Administration, which placed more of an emphasis on targeting higher-ups 
within Al-Qaeda, the Obama Administration has been targeting rank-in-file foot soldiers.
58
  
Further, the lack of a procedural framework being handed down from prior administrations has 
increased the Obama Administration’s laissez faire approach.  And it appears that this 
Administration is acutely aware of the possibility that the current policy could get out of hand 
very quickly.    
 So much so that in 2012 with the looming possibility of defeat in the Presidential 
Election, the Obama Administration attempted to develop explicit rules for the targeting of 
terrorists.
59
  If President Obama lost the election, the incoming President and his Administration 
would inherit certain guidelines and possible legislation outlining standard operating procedure 
pertaining to targeted killings, thus neutering the inbound cabinet in a proverbial sense.
60
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 In reality, attempts to codify the current policy, on behalf of the Obama Administration, 
began as early as 2011.
61
  An unnamed official within the Obama Administration said, “There 
was concern that the levers might no longer be in our hands” and “Obama did not want to leave 
an amorphous program to his successor.”62  Had Romney won the election codifying the policy 
would have been rushed with a target completion date by January; however, since Romney lost it 
will now be done at a more leisurely pace.
63
  With regard to the current policy Obama has stated, 
“One of the things we’ve got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and we need 
Congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in but any 
president’s reined in terms of some of the decisions that we’re making.”64   
 Now, it may require some logical insight, but after hearing the Obama Administration’s 
policy on targeted killing, one can conclude that what they are doing stretches the outer bounds 
of the law.  The current policy lacks the legislative framework that would, otherwise, establish 
the parameters and boundaries necessary when the executive branch of the government 
unilaterally targets enemy combatants far from the designated battlefield and without the foreign 
country’s consent.  Further, President Obama clearly has reservations with the current program; 
however, he is doing very little to implement change.     
 Although the current policy is not in violation of the law, it is creating certain foreign 
policy implications that could have resounding effects in the years to come.  For instance, if 
other countries in the near future implement a similar policy and use the current U.S. program as 
a template, than the battlefield is seemingly endless.  Theoretically, any country could target any 
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individual in any part of the world without consequence.  If the U.S. desires to be a global leader 
going forward, then certain governmental policies, such as the current targeted killing program, 
must be reformed. 
c. Critics of the current targeted killing program. 
 Critics of the current policy mirror some of the arguments made in the preceding section 
of this paper.  The American Civil Liberties Union claims that a program of targeted 
extrajudicial killings far from any battlefield, without criminally charging that individual and 
placing that individual on trial, is in violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process.
65
 
 Opponents of extrajudicial targeted killings essentially claim that, under international 
humanitarian law (IHL), the lawful killing of an enemy belligerent is, otherwise, permissible in 
an area of armed conflict.
66
  The key point to understand here is that the killing must occur in 
areas of armed conflict, and since the U.S. is not engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan, nor 
any of its territory, the targeted killing of Bin Laden was illegal under international law.   
 Accordingly, in the absence of an established “zone of armed conflict”, IHL does not 
apply (i.e., jus in bello), and, therefore, to classify an enemy target as a belligerent does not 
work.
67
  So what exactly does that mean?  It means that targeted killings in countries like 
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia are illegal.
68
  Further, under conventional IHL standards, the 
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involvement of the CIA is also illegal because CIA agents are classified as civilians and civilians 
do not have the right to use force.
69
 
   Opponents of the program insist that U.S. forces should have captured Bin Laden, 
extradited him to a U.S. territory, charged him, and placed him on trial.  This type of argument 
may carry some merit in theory; however, in reality, it would have incurred a tremendous 
amount of resistance.  Had the U.S. acted in this manner issues of extradition, choice of venue, 
and place of detention, to name a few, would have impeded the chance of a free, fair, and 
expedient trial.    
 Opponents of the current program also claim that it is in violation of international law 
due to the fact that lethal force may only be used outside of an armed conflict as a last resort to 
prevent the imminent threat of attack, and also when non-lethal means are not available.
70
  They 
claim that the U.S. is turning the entire world into a battlefield by targeting suspected terrorists 
for execution, far from any warzone.
71
  Further, a policy that adds names to a “kill list” through 
bureaucratic secrecy, and whose names remain on a list for months if not years undermines the 
notion that those individuals are an imminent threat.
72
   
 While the aforementioned argument is insightful, in reality it is unsound.  The U.S. has 
declared a “war on terror”.  Terrorist network cells exist throughout the world, and they thrive in 
third world countries that have trouble policing their own citizens.  The U.S. is not trying to 
create a global battlefield, it is just trying to dispose of certain threats that it deems necessary and 
imminent.  Targeted killings are generally precise and effective and they also reduce civilian 
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casualties.  Pertaining to Bin Laden, the Obama Administration deemed him an ongoing threat to 
U.S. national security and they had a very narrow window to act.  
 Whereas the past two sections have addressed targeted killings from a statutory and 
abstract perspective, the next section will analyze targeted killings from a national sovereignty 
standpoint.  Pakistan’s involvement has been overlooked thus far.  However, determining 
whether Pakistan consented or was unable or unwilling to capture or kill Bin Laden is critical in 
assessing whether the targeted killing of him was legal under international law. 
III. Pakistan’s Sovereignty.  
 Approximately twenty-four heliborne U.S. Navy SEALs commenced the raid on Bin 
Laden’s compound from a military base in neighboring Afghanistan.73   Obama and his top 
military advisors temporarily transferred the military personnel assigned to the mission to the 
control of the civilian based Central Intelligence Agency.
74
 From a legal standpoint this is key 
because the U.S. was not at war with Pakistan and, had they sent U.S. military into a non-
warzone for the purpose of killing an enemy target, it would have been a clear violation of 
Pakistan’s sovereignty under international law.  However, since they were transferred to a 
civilian division no violation occurred.    
 According to a top official within the Obama Administration, the U.S. did not make 
Pakistan privy to the mission until its aftermath.
75
  However, there are mixed reports as to how 
much Pakistan knew.  Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry claimed that U.S. forces solely conducted the 
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raid.
76
  On the other hand, officials within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISS) claimed 
that it was a joint operation, one in which they were present at.
77
  Pakistan’s President Asif Ali 
Zardari vehemently denied this claim
78
 and Pakistan’s foreign secretary Salman Bashir 
confirmed that they became aware of the mission mid-way through and they sent F-16s to the 
compound, but U.S. helicopters had already left.
79
   In light of the foregoing, for purposes of this 
paper, it will be assumed that Pakistan was neither aware of the attack nor consented to it. 
a. Legal Analysis  
 Pakistan maintains that this mission was a violation of its sovereignty.  Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani claimed that the mission was not done in accordance with 
international law, human rights law, or humanitarian law.
80
  Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
prohibits the use of force by one state against another.
81
  However, Article 2(4) recognizes two 
exceptions: (1) when force is carried out with consent of the host state, and (2) when the use of 
force is an act of self-defense in response to an armed attack or an imminent threat, and where 
the host state is unwilling or unable to take appropriate action.
82
  Whereas the former does not 
apply because Pakistan did not consent, the latter could apply if the U.S. can show that it was 
acting in self-defense to an imminent threat. 
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 Those who claim that the mission was in violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty argue that 
neither of the two exceptions under Article 2(4) apply.
83
  Under the first exception they claim 
that it is clear that Pakistan did not consent to the raid.
84
  Again, as stated supra, this paper will 
concede that notion.   Under the second exception opponents claim that there is some doubt as to 
whether the terrorist attacks on September 11
th
 are enough to justify a targeted killing program in 
2011.
85
  They argue that the United States’ loose interpretation of the self-defense clause violates 
the second exception under Article 2(4).  Further, they claim that placing an individual on a kill 
list for months, if not years, at a time disproves the notion of an imminent threat.
86
  Finally, they 
contend that Pakistan was capable of taking action against Bin Laden had the U.S. informed 
them that he was in their country.
87
 
 While the opposition makes a compelling argument that the mission was unlawful under 
international law, their reasoning and logic is simply unsound.  Their argument lacks merit due 
to the foregoing reasons: (i) the U.S. along with most of the modern world is at war with 
terrorism, (ii) Bin Laden, as the leader of Al-Qaeda, posed an ongoing and continuous imminent 
threat to U.S. national security, (iii) the U.S. was justified in taking action against Bin Laden 
when it saw the opportunity, (iv) the use of force was limited in scope and proportional to the 
threat Bin Laden posed, and (v) the U.S. may use force against Al-Qaeda consistent with its 
inherent right to self-defense.
88
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 Pakistan was also unable or unwilling to take action against Bin Laden.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that Abbottabad is a hotbed for terrorist activity.  On numerous occasions, 
members of Al-Qaeda have fled the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan and have found refuge 
in the Pakistani city.
89
  There are also various reports that the Pakistani Government was 
shielding Bin Laden.
90
  Just from an intuitive standpoint it is clear that those reports and 
allegations deserve merit because Bin Laden’s compound was minutes from one of Pakistan’s 
Military Academies.
91
   
 In addition to the foregoing, U.S. Government files, leaked by WikiLeaks, revealed that 
U.S. Diplomats were being informed that Pakistani Officials were tipping off Bin Laden every 
time U.S. forces neared his compound.
92
  There are also reports that Pakistan’s ISI was covertly 
running Al-Qaeda militants into Afghanistan to fight NATO.
93
  Finally, in December 2009, the 
Government of Tajikistan informed U.S. officials that Pakistan was well aware of Bin Laden’s 
compound.
94
  The U.S. Government simply could not trust Pakistan, and when asked about the 
raid CIA Chief Leon Panetta said that the CIA did want to inform Pakistan of the operation 
because it feared that “any effort to work with the Pakistanis [would] jeopardize the mission.”95  
 There is clearly a stronger argument, under international law, that the actions of the U.S. 
Government in targeting and killing Bin Laden were legal.  The U.S. had to act with secrecy and 
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the decisions made by Obama and his cabinet were justified as an act of self-defense warding off 
the imminent threat of attack from another terrorist plot.  While there is a strong case that the 
U.S. officials who ordered the raid did not violate international law, there still may be an issue as 
to whether the direct actions of the SEALs on May 2, 2011 were in contravention to U.S. law or 
international law.  The final section of this paper will address the issue.  
IV. Actions of the U.S. Navy Seals’ on the night of the raid.  
 A number of experts are concerned that the question of legality may come down to Bin 
Laden’s response at the moment U.S. Navy SEALs raided his compound and, more precisely, the 
moment at which they burst into his room.
96
  They claim that if a person has his hands in the air 
and is surrendering you are not authorized to kill him.
97
  Therefore, even if the President had the 
statutory authority to order the raid, targeted killings are not illegal under international law, and 
the operation did not invade Pakistan’s sovereignty; the U.S. may still have violated international 
law based on the actions of the SEALs.   
 International law requires that the SEALs killing of Bin Laden must have been done in 
self-defense.
98
  Acting in self-defense hinges on the requirement that members of the Seals team 
“reasonably believed there was a risk to themselves.”99  Days following the raid CIA Director 
Leon Panetta said, “[under] the rules of engagement, if he had in fact thrown up his hands, 
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surrendered, and didn’t appear to be representing any kind of threat, then they were to capture 
him. But they had full authority to kill him.”100 
 The initial order to capture Bin Laden eviscerated as soon as the SEALs entered the 
compound due to the fact that a firefight erupted immediately.
101
  One of Bin Laden’s guards Al-
Kuwaiti opened fire on the first SEAL team with an AK-47.
102
  After the initial exchange of fire 
between the SEALs and Bin Laden’s henchmen, the SEALs identified Bin Laden on the third 
floor of the main building.
103
  As Bin Laden peered over a ledge, one of the SEALs that were 
engaging him took at shot at him.
104
  It was dark and the SEALs had previously sustained fire.  It 
is, therefore, clear that the SEALs reasonably believed they were at risk.  As Bin Laden was 
being shot at he retreated to his bedroom and the SEALs followed.
105
  More fire erupted in his 
bedroom and it is unclear as to what exactly happened at this point, but eventually the proverbial 
“smoke cleared” and Bin Laden was lying on the ground in a pool of blood -- dead.106  The 
report indicated that there were two guns next to Bin Laden’s body.107  Of approximately twenty 
individuals on the compound only four were killed including Bin Laden.
108
  Further, during the 
raid, the SEALs restrained the women and children with plastic hand-ties and did not harm 
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them.
109
  Within forty-five minutes the SEALs were back on the Black Hawk Helicopters with 
Bin Laden’s body.110  The casualties were minimal and the mission was viewed as an extremely 
successful one.  
 It is apparent that the SEALs did not violate U.S. domestic law or international law 
during the raid.  Bin Laden’s compound was heavily fortified with trap doors and armed militia.  
They exchanged fire numerous times during the raid and there are reports that Bin Laden shot at 
them.  Therefore, they were under reasonable belief that their lives were in danger when they 
shot and killed Bin Laden.  Most importantly, a U.S. official claimed that during the raid Bin 
Laden did not “hold up his hands and surrender.”111  Another report claims that Bin Laden was 
offered the possibility to surrender, but he failed to “raise the white flag.”112  By virtue of his 
position as the head of Al-Qaeda Bin Laden was an enemy belligerent, and if he wanted to 
surrender he needed to make that immediately clear to the SEALs.
113
  Not run into his bedroom 
and try to grab a weapon. 
V. Conclusion. 
 Bin Laden posed an ongoing and continuous threat to U.S. national security.  He was the 
head of Al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization that had conducted the attacks of September 11
th
.
114
  
Under international law the U.S. has the inherent right to target and kill that individual as an act 
of self-defense.  Some experts argue that the operation was a violation of both international law 
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and U.S. domestic law; however, their argument is unsubstantiated and without merit.  Although 
the raid was conducted in a manner fully consistent with the laws of war, the U.S. must be 
vigilant of the precedent this sets going forward.   
   
 
 
 
